WP 116 - Comparative study of labour relations in African countries by Hayter, S.
AIAS
Amsterdam Institute for
       Advanced  labour  Studies
University of Amsterdam AIAS
Comparative study of labour 
relations in African countries 
Rüya Gökhan Koçer and Susan Hayter
Working Paper 116
December 2011Acknowledgement
The country studies that form the background to this paper were commissioned for 
an ILO research project on trends in industrial relations in Africa. Support for the 
project was provided by both the ILO Department of Industrial and Employment 
Relations and the ILO Regional Ofﬁ  ce for Africa. However, the views expressed in 
this paper are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent those 
of the ILO.
December 2011
© Rüya Gökhan Koçer and Susan Hayter, Amsterdam
Bibliographic information
Koçer, R.G. and Hayter, S. (2011). Comparative study of labour relations in African countries. 
University of Amsterdam, AIAS Working Paper 116.
Author information
Rüya Gökhan Koçer is Social Scientist and Statistician. He received his PhD degree from the 
University of Amsterdam.
Susan Hayter is Senior Industrial and Employment Relations Specialist at the ILO. She received her 
MSc from the London School of Economics. 
Information may be quoted provided the source is stated accurately and clearly. Reproduction for 
own/internal use is permitted. 
This paper can be downloaded from our website www.uva-aias.net under the section:    
Publications/Working papers.Comparative study of 








Rüya Gökhan Koçer and Susan HayterPage ● 5
Study of labour relations in African countries
Table of contents
ABSTRACT .....................................................................................................................................7
1. INTRODUCTION  ........................................................................................................................9
2. DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES ......................................................13
3. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS’ ACTORS .................................................................................................21
4. LABOR MARKET IN AFRICA .......................................................................................................31
5. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS PROCESSES: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND MINIMUM WAGE   ..........................41
6. CONCLUSION  .......................................................................................................................47
REFERENCES   ................................................................................................................................53
AIAS WORKING PAPERS ...............................................................................................................57
INFORMATION ABOUT AIAS ...........................................................................................................65Page ● 6
Rüya Gökhan Koçer and Susan HayterPage ● 7
Study of labour relations in African countries
Abstract
In this paper we present a generic analytical picture of the development of national labour relations in 
Africa. We outline common features of industrial relations` actors and institutions, and, analyze the general 
conditions of labour markets in which these actors and institutions operate. We show that organized indus-
trial relations in Africa face serious challenges but there are also new opportunities and strategies that might 
enable collective actors to cope with these challenges, and, contribute to the solution of Africa’s structural 
problems.Page ● 8
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1. Introduction
Africa is a large and very diverse continent. Although, during the last decade there have been some posi-
tive developments in terms of economic growth and purchasing power, many African countries face serious 
economic challenges despite their rich natural resources (ILO 2010). Labour markets reﬂ  ect this broader 
context. Only a little more than a quarter of Africa’s workers are wage or salary earners while most own-
account and contributing family work is in the agricultural sector. Moreover half of those in employment 
are ‘working poor’ falling below the $1.25 per day poverty line (ILO, 2011).  
In this environment a range of formal and informal institutions across Africa shape employment re-
lationships and labour outcomes in peculiar and innovative ways. The examination of the challenges these 
institutions face and dynamics they generate in labour markets in different countries are important themes 
for both policy makers and scholars.1 However, the study of comparative industrial and labour relations in 
Africa has received very little attention2.
Obviously, given that the focus of industrial relations is typically on “all forms of economic activity in 
which an employee works under the authority of an employer and receives a wage for his or her labour” 
(Edwards, 2003:1) one might wonder whether studying comparative industrial relations in African context 
in which the majority is not in an employment relationship makes sense. There are three reasons why the 
analysis of labour and industrial relations practice in African countries may serve as a guide to developing 
policy advice. 
First one is quite straightforward: the share of those in wage employment may be small in relative terms 
but their absolute number makes them a sizable population warranting the attention of policy makers. For 
example, in Sub-Saharan Africa while wage employment does not exceed an estimated 23.5 percent, this 
share amounts to more than 100 million people (see Table 1 and ILO, 2010). Naturally, actors, institutions 
and practices which regulate and shape employment relations for these millions of workers  deserve further 
analysis.   
1  Examples of volumes on industrial relations in Africa include Wood, 2008; Wood and Brewster, 2007; Fashoyin, 1992; Da-
machi, Seibel and Trachtman, 1979; and Roberts and Bellecombe, 1967.
2  We use the term ‘industrial relations’ in the broad sense to refer to the ﬁ  eld of study of relations between managers and work-
ers in all sectors of economic activity. We note the tendency in recent literature to refer to ‘employment relations’, however 
since our interest is in collective employment relations and since the terms itself is well established in the literature, we prefer 
to retain the term ‘industrial relations’. Page ● 10
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Second, whereas own-account workers represent a signiﬁ  cant proportion of those in employment, 
these and others employed in informal economy often fall outside of the direct impact of labour market 
policies and institutions. The result is growing marginalization of those in the informal economy and seg-
mented patterns of development. However, informal and formal modes of employment are quite often 
functionally connected and the study of organized industrial relations would reveal the dynamics of these 
connections and allow us to understand how formal employment indirectly affects and being affected by 
informal  employment. Such an insight would facilitate the organization and representation of own-account 
workers in tripartite arrangements, and  can be helpful in devising strategies in order to integrate the inter-
ests of the working population in its entirety into economic and social development plans.
Table 1: Shares of Status in Employment (2008)
Region Employment shares by status  Male Female Total
Africa Wage and salaried workers 35.4 % 18.0 % 28.4 %
Employers 4.0 % 1.0 % 2.8 %
Own- account workers 41.3 % 38.7 % 40.2 %
Contributing family workers 19.4 % 42.4 % 28.6 %
North Africa Wage and salaried workers 53.5 % 39.6 % 50.0 %
Employers 12.4 % 2.2 % 9.8 %
Own- account workers 22.6 % 21.2 % 22.2 %
Contributing family workers 11.5 % 37.0 % 17.9 %
Sub- Saharan 
Africa
Wage and salaried workers 30.0 % 15.2 % 23.5 %
Employers 1.5 % 0.8 % 1.2 %
Own-account workers 46.8 % 40.9 % 44.2 %
Contributing family workers 21.7 % 43.1 % 31.0 %
source: ILO trends and econometric models October 2010
Finally, although, thanks to detailed analyses of industrial relations systems in other continents,  we   
know that despite similar challenges posed by globalization of production relations institutional diversity 
across countries is likely to persist, we don’t know whether or to what extent this is also true in Africa. 
General tendency in the literature on Africa is to focus on common challenges that countries face rather 
than scrutinizing the degree of distinctiveness in their responses.  One reason for this analytical perspective, 
of course, is the small number and limited scope of comparative analyses which try to comprehend and 
reveal African industrial relations as something distinctive from the rest of the world. However, in order 
to acknowledge and distinguish commonalities and peculiarities in African industrial relations we need to 
scrutinize speciﬁ  c institutional responses that emerge out of common patterns. This, obviously, requires to Page ● 11
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examine organized industrial relations in Africa in its own terms, maintaining sufﬁ  ciently macro perspective 
so as to discern general patterns  while acknowledging country speciﬁ  c institutional arrangements and actor 
strategies. Such an endeavour would be a valuable resource for policy makers designing legal and institu-
tional frameworks that both give effect to fundamental principles concerning freedom of association and 
the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, and contribute to inclusive development. This   
can provide a basis for ongoing discussions regarding the harmonisation and coordination of policies and 
laws by the Regional Economic Communities and other regional economic cooperation bodies in Africa.    
Against this background, the purpose of this working paper is twofold: First, to present an analytical 
framework for understanding the evolution of national labour relations institutions in Africa and their con-
tribution to inclusive development. Second, to show that organized industrial relations in Africa face serious 
challenges but there are also new opportunities and strategies that might enable collective actors to cope 
with these challenges and contribute to the solution  of Africa’s structural problems. 
In the following pages we ﬁ  rst provide an analytical picture of historical developments in order to reveal 
the way in which institutional structure of African industrial relations have developed and actors emerged. 
In the second section we introduce the general characteristics of the main actors, namely, the state, trade 
unions and employers’ organizations, and provide some hints as to the nature of tripartism. The follow-
ing section gives the brief overview of the context, that is the labour market, in which these actors must 
operate. Finally, we examine the way in which the core industrial relations institutions, namely collective 
bargaining and minimum wage, function in Africa. The paper ends with a summary of the challenges and 
opportunities in front of African industrial relations.Page ● 12
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2.  Development of industrial relations in 
African countries
Although using a historical perspective may not always be the most beneﬁ  cial approach for compre-
hending the dynamics of contemporary organized industrial relations, in the case of Africa, any scrutiny of 
current institutional arrangements of organized industrial relations would be more insightful if one takes 
into account the past developments. This is because in Africa quite often industrial relations’ actors, espe-
cially trade unions, have been paving the way for new forms of governance and regulation. That is, the way 
in which industrial relations were organized and trade unions have operated was inﬂ  uential in transitions 
from colonial rule to independence (Orr 1966) and also from dictatorships of various kinds into multi-party 
democracies (Kraus 2007), with immense consequences for the regulation of employment relations and 
labour markets.  Thus appropriate conceptualization of these developments might provide some hints as to 
the future prospects of  actors and institutions of organized industrial  relations in Africa. 
Obviously, in order to accomplish this task one should navigate in the complex landscape of institu-
tional diversities and historical contingencies of more than 50 African countries. However, for the sake of 
analytical clarity, it is possible to outline some broad patterns in the development of industrial relations in 
Africa. For this purpose in ﬁ  gure 1 we provide a generic (and quite a stylized) picture which contains three 
periods and two crucial transitions that were common across African countries.  Let’s elaborate on this ge-
neric representation.
Figure 1: Generic Picture of development of industrial relations in Africa
Page ● 14
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Colonialism and Control 
History of organized industrial relations across Africa is closely intertwined with the struggle for inde-
pendence and democracy (Zelig and Seddon, 2002; Harcourt and Wood 2004; Kester, 2007). As depicted 
in the ﬁ  rst period, the roots of collective bargaining in many African countries can be traced back to the 
colonial period when wage-labor in modern sense had began to emerge. However, this analytical emphasis 
on colonial era should not lead one to overlook the impact of pre-colonial inheritances of various African 
regions on industrial relations developments. For example, one may argue that  prior to the settlement of 
colonial powers, different from  the central and east regions of the continent, there had been a long tradition 
of  “craft and tradesmen’s  guilds, and mutual beneﬁ  t societies” in north and west Africa, and due this back-
ground, workers in these regions were “quite receptive” to union formation and to the process of collective 
bargaining (Orr 1966). In fact the resilience of African trade unions in the subsequent periods of retrench-
ment and adversity can be to some extent explained by the fact that they were not organizational inventions 
imported from “developed” countries but they had been ﬁ  rmly connected to and partly emanated from old 
traditions of reciprocity in Africa.
Having this caveat in mind if we look at the colonial era we see that in this period British and French   
territories  revealed  different patterns of industrial relations, which to a certain extent still render  countries 
founded on these territories distinguishable from each other in terms of employment regulations (Dioh 
2010:23, Gockel 2009: 18). In French territories, legislations regarding the collective organizations were 
directly linked to civil right laws, and this provided better conditions for collective interest representation 
organizations compared to British controlled regions (Croucher 2007:199-200). 
In fact, African workers’ unions were formed rather easily, though often not for long durations, since the 
late 19th century in French territories and occasionally French workers also admitted Africans to their own 
unions. Interestingly trade unions in French territories were considered branches of unions in France. Due 
to this organic connection, especially after the Second World War many unionists from France (and also 
from Belgium) were sent to Africa in order to organize African workers (Damachi et al 1979:4-5). On the 
other hand, we see another logic in the development of organized industrial relations in British west Africa. 
In this region there was no signiﬁ  cant presence of European settler working class thus African workers 
could establish their own unions as ﬁ  rst step towards initiating collective bargaining and British authori-
ties have tolerated these unions for the sake of founding orderly industrial relations. Although, unlike the 
French case, unions in British territories did not have organic connections with unions in Britain, develop-Page ● 15
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ments in Britain were still inﬂ  uential in the dynamics of African industrial relations (Roberts & Bellecombe 
1967:xi, see Stirling also 2011:238). For example, insistence of British Labor party in 1940 that colonial 
administrations should facilitate the operations of trade unions in Africa considered an important impetus 
for union movement in British territories (Orr 1966).  
One can see that emergence of organized industrial relations in French and British territories, despite 
initially negative attitude of authorities, had been outcome of different but essentially non-adversarial pro-
cesses (Michael 1992:30-31). Of course, colonial rulers’ acceptance of trade unions  did not mean that their 
relations with unions had been peaceful. On the contrary,  both British and French authorities had to cope 
with industrial actions organized by trade unions not only to articulate employment related grievances but 
also – increasingly - for political purposes (Damachi et al 1979:2-8). However, neither in French nor in Brit-
ish territories recognition of African unions itself had been a major source of conﬂ  ict.  
The case of Southern Africa was quite different. Here European settlers considered African workers 
as potential job rivals and treated them with enmity (Cooper 1996:6). Consequently, as organized industrial 
relations began to function smoothly and African trade unions were ﬁ  rmly established in British west Af-
rica and in French territories in the aftermath of the Second World War, black trade unions could not be 
ofﬁ  cially registered and were not legally recognized in Southern Africa. This adversarial attitude would be 
made into law explicitly in South Africa by the Labor Relations Act of 1953. The other two major colonial 
powers’ attitude towards organized industrial relations for African workers had remained in between these 
two typologies: Belgium authorities, despite their “autocratic and ruthless” regime, somewhat pursued the 
French path towards African unions (Damachi et al 1979:4), but Portuguese rule remained adversarial.  
Against this background, one may argue that differences in the way in which industrial relations are or-
ganized across African countries have been the result of complex  interactions between pre-colonial mutual 
help and artisanship arrangements, legal traditions and politics of colonial powers, and the degree of an-
tagonism and rivalry between European settler labor and African workers, which itself might be a function 
of production processes and skill requirements imposed by the nature of economic resources of colonies.     
The keyword, as depicted in ﬁ  gure 1, that makes sense of these developments in organized industrial 
relations during the colonial era was control. From the perspective of colonial powers  the continuity of the 
stability in colonial political economies, which were based on the extraction of natural resources and pres-
ervation of markets for ﬁ  nished products, was of crucial importance. This stability could be ensured  by   
maintaining the administrative and economic dependence of native workforce on colonial authorities, and, Page ● 16
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by separation of economic demands from potentially dangerous political ones (see Dahrendorf 1959:277, 
Taylor 1989:186) Thus, African trade unions and (limited) collective bargaining were tolerated or encour-
aged  essentially as means for controlling disruptive dynamics that might threaten the stability of colonial 
systems. However, this policy appears to have been not entirely successful. For African trade unions in colo-
nial period resembled to social movements. They used their mobilization capacity not only for employment 
related demands but also for wider political and economic interests of native societies (Horwitz 2007:221). 
For example, in Tanzania TFL (Tanganyika Federation of Labor) was the peak labor organization prior to 
national independence and it was an important proponent of nationalist movement (Mlimka 2010:2). Simi-
larly, in Ghana, GTUC (Ghana Trade Union Congress) had become a leading actor in the struggle for self 
government (Gockel 2009:41).
Thus, not surprisingly, trade unions played crucial roles in the independence movements and recognized 
everywhere as standard components of African nationalism.
Independence and Cooptation 
This observation brings us to the ﬁ  rst transition in ﬁ  gure 1, which marks the end of colonial period and the 
commencement of independence of African countries. Needless to say that this transition took place at differ-
ent times and various speeds across the continent. The case of South Africa once again remains exceptional. 
There transition occurred quite late, and the liberation was not from colonial powers but from a racist rule. 
However in general at the beginning of this second period African unions, not only because of the role 
they played in independence movements but also due to their human resources, have become recruiting 
ground for the administrations and business communities of newly founded states. One would expect the 
participation of union leaders in government bureaucracies to enhance the degree of workers’ involvement in 
these states. In most of the cases, however, trade unions could not be effective representatives of their own 
constituencies within new government structures, and instead they gradually lost their autonomy and plurality. 
For example in Tanzania soon after independence the peak labor organization TFL had been disbanded and 
instead government dominated NUTA (National Union of Tanganyika Workers) was established and all trade 
unions remained under the tutelage of the ruling party for three decades (Mlimka 2010:2,26). Similarly in Mo-
zambique in the early 1980’s government created a federation, Organization for Mozambican Workers (OTM), 
that brought together (and under government control) sixteen big trade unions (Pitcher 2007:138) Page ● 17
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The reason was that in post-independence era various forms of developmentalist economic agendas 
were adopted by African governments and industrial relations regulations inherited from the colonial pe-
riod had been reformed so as to render collective actors subservient towards the goals of these economic 
programmes dictated by new elites. As an important common consequence of the new regulatory sys-
tems we see the establishment of umbrella organizations for trade unions, or in some cases  emergence 
of monolithic confederations, which were instrumentalized by ruling parties as tools of legitimation and 
control. This was quite often accompanied by the curtailment of organizational rights of workers in order 
to prevent emergence of alternative collective entities. However, at another level, this process of internal-
ization of worker organizations in corporatist manner by political systems may have enabled trade unions 
to consolidate their position as legitimate actors in African political economies and may have triggered the 
formation of employers’ organizations. Thus one may argue that social partners as the basic ingredient of 
genuine social dialogue might have emerged as an unintended consequence of the developmentalist agenda 
in many African countries. 
Other two important features of developmentalist regulatory structures in African countries were the 
introduction of minimum wages and ratiﬁ  cation of extensive number of ILO conventions regarding the 
conditions of work (Alby et al 2005). Though it should be acknowledged that  the ability and willingness 
of African governments to implement higher  employment standards implied by these measures remained 
quite limited. Developmentalist policies were also crucial for the establishment of state enterprises and 
expansion of public employment across Africa, which enlarged the base of recruitment for existing trade 
unions and provided fertile ground for the emergence of new worker organizations, which would eventu-
ally challenge the existing monolithic worker representation structures that were created by ruling parties 
(Pitcher 2007). 
Although developmentalist agenda to some extent succeeded in establishing basic infrastructure, edu-
cation facilities and health services in some African countries,  it has essentially failed in diversiﬁ  cation of 
economic activities and in production of value-added exports (though the reasons were not entirely endog-
enous) and gradually led to foreign exchange shortages, increasing public debt and high inﬂ  ation. By the late 
1970’s many African countries were in deep economic crises and could not be stabilized without external 
help which, in turn, came in a rather unfortunate manner in the form of one-size-ﬁ  ts-all structural adjust-
ment programmes imposed by Breton–Woods institutions (Wood & Brewster 2007:2-3). In a rather familiar 
pattern the implementation of austerity measures and trade liberalization envisaged by these programmes Page ● 18
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were soon accompanied by the demands of democratization and political rights from hitherto repressed 
societal actors. Consequently, as the economic model envisaged by developmentalist agenda was dismantled 
by externally imposed measures, its political base was challenged by internally generated  demands of de-
mocratization and human rights. 
We argue that the keyword, as depicted in ﬁ  gure 1, that captures the essence  of organized industrial 
relations during the post-independence era was cooptation. From the perspective of new elites that dominated 
the state apparatus in many African countries during this period the developmentalist agenda was crucial 
not only in terms of its explicit goals of economic improvement but it was also vital as an instrument of 
legitimation that ensured the continuity of ruling governments. Trade unions were potentially detrimental 
for such continuity due to their proven ability to act as social movements which might  articulate the griev-
ances of wider society and may mobilize their members in the process unless they were taken under the 
strict control of the state. In fact the very nature of developmentalist project, due to establishment of state 
enterprises and  expansion of public services, expanded the recruitment base of trade unions and rendered 
their control inevitable for ruling elites. Thus, trade union movements across most African countries were 
co-opted by the state. They were transformed from being representative social movements into proponents 
of developmentalist agenda who were instrumentalized by ruling parties in order to enforce and propagate 
their rule. However, this policy of cooptation would be no more successful than the attempts of colonial 
powers to use trade unions as instruments of control. In fact in majority of African countries trade unions 
gradually liberated themselves from their co-opted  position, or workers formed new trade unions,  and thus 
union movement assumed a prominent role in political liberalization through its demands for political rights 
and freedom of association (Kraus 2007).
Democratization and Cooperation & Contestation 
With this remark we come to the second transition in ﬁ  gure 1 through which the developmentalist agen-
da of independence period gave way to structural adjustment programmes and gradual democratization.
In fact, as the developmentalist agendas were replaced by externally imposed austerity measures, many 
African societies have already been struggling with the consequences of deep economic crisis. In this envi-
ronment the recipes proposed by structural adjustment programmes, instead of providing immediate solu-
tions to day-to-day problems of workers, promoted further reductions in wages, and undermined already 
weak social policies by demanding drastic cuts in public expenditures. These measures tested the reciproc-
ity relations among people that were hitherto capable of providing safety nets against adversities. To this Page ● 19
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already bleak picture, one should also add the increasing unemployment resulting from rapid privatizations 
envisaged by austerity measures. Thus, from the 1980’s onwards, in many African countries, the public 
resentment generated by economic crisis has been further augmented by the adverse consequences of 
structural adjustment programmes, which permanently promised but failed to deliver growth and prosperity 
in the long term in exchange for short term hardships  (Horwitz  2007:222-223). Under these conditions, 
workers were highly agitated but existing institutions of industrial relations, that is, monolithic union struc-
tures and government dominated policy making which were inherited in many African countries from the 
developmentalist period, were incapable of addressing their grievances. Similarly, like in other parts of the 
world, structural adjustment plans were initially accompanied by authoritarian and anti-democratic  govern-
ments which precluded the articulation of societal resentment in the political realm.  
Thus, one may argue that in Africa, the shift from developmentalism into supposedly open-market 
economies, has taken place in an environment where neither industrial relations institutions nor channels of 
political representation worked properly so as to allow the grievances of people to be addressed. 
In this environment, existing trade unions, unlike their attitude during the period of developmentalism, 
began to be more receptive towards the demands of their rank & ﬁ  le and when this did not occur some 
splinter groups initiated new -ofﬁ  cial or informal- worker organizations (Kraus 2007). Of course, given the 
magnitude of resentment resulted from accumulated grievances of last two decades, by the early 1990’s, 
in many African countries it was not only  trade unions or workers who were disturbed. By then, almost 
all segments of African societies were desiring more freedom and rule of law in order to be able to voice 
their resentment. Thus gradually African countries began to witness process of democratization, though, 
this process sometimes accompanied or followed by ﬁ  erce internal struggles or hijacked by military coups. 
It is important to note that this type of chronological  proximity between neo-liberal reforms and so-
cietal desire for democratization should not be considered merely coincidental (Laothamatas 1997:7). In 
order to explain this link between neo-liberalism and democracy it is argued that the need of international 
capital for stability requires “democratic harmony”, and “greater  popular sovereignty” appears to be the 
general demand of citizens in environments experiencing neo-liberalism especially in the developing coun-
tries (Udayagiri and Walton 2003:318, Koçer 2009).  
Thus, in African countries too, we witness steps towards democratization, which involved recognition 
of the right to association and freedom of speech. In fact during the last decade in countries  like Egypt, 
Somalia, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Zambia and Mauritius, new legislations have been enacted, sometimes as Page ● 20
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a result of genuinely tripartite negotiations, in order to re-regulate the industrial relations (see Horowitz 
2007:228). A general feature of these laws, which try to ensure the compatibility between labor market 
regulations and new global production dynamics, is to emphasize and encourage dispute resolution through 
peaceful negotiations and to clarify and simplify statutory requirements for the establishment of new col-
lective representation organizations.
In this environment, in many African countries industrial relations have entered a new phase. While 
in the past  representation of workers’ interest has been delegated to limited number of relatively strong 
peak organizations and sectoral trade unions, under the conditions of democratization, not only number of 
trade unions with small membership has increased but also hitherto unknown actors, such as NGO’s, social 
movements and international networks began to involve in industrial relations dynamics (Pitcher 2007). 
We argue that the keywords that capture the essence of this new period for industrial relations’ actors 
are cooperation and contestation. For, now trade unions in many African countries, perhaps ﬁ  rst time in 
their history, must develop strategies in order to cope with increasing number of collective representation 
alternatives offered by new civil society actors for workers. Similarly, both employers’ organizations and 
trade unions, given the emphasis put on dispute resolution, must seek ways to settle their issues without re-
sorting to overt conﬂ  ict. However, it is important to note that this new environment also poses trade unions 
the danger of a new kind of cooptation. Given that, despite the processes of democratization, structural 
factors ( unemployment, informal sector, low-skills) still render workers relatively weak vis-à-vis employers, 
new and often small trade unions may gradually ﬁ  nd themselves in coercive partnerships with employers 
(see Koçer 2007) 
Having  this historical conceptualization in mind, in the next section we will brieﬂ  y focus on the general 
features of the main  actors of industrial relations in Africa, namely, the state, trade unions and employers’ 
organizations.Page ● 21
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3.  Industrial relations’ actors
The state
Regulation of labour market through laws and enforcement mechanisms, and, establishing institutions 
of coordination and consultation in order to ensure economic growth and sustainability are perhaps the 
two most crucial of roles of the state in industrial relations. Indeed, by effectively playing these two roles 
the state limits the commodiﬁ  cation of labour, thus ensures productive use of human capital, and, con-
verts economic activity from being a purposeless pursuit of proﬁ  t into an instrument that serves socially 
desirable goals of human development (Block 1994, Hay 2004). Obviously, these roles require a degree of, 
what might be called, state capacity, that is, the existence of resources- human and ﬁ  nancial- to make and 
implement regulations, and the ability of independent decision making that would allow governments to 
formulate long term social and economic policies in accordance with the needs of their societies.
In many African countries, these conditions of effective involvement of the state in industrial relations 
have been, at least theoretically, present to some degree in the immediate aftermath of independence, when 
“ much was permitted and something was possible” (Cooper 1996:1). This was not because of abundant 
resources that could be reserved for effective enforcement of labour regulations, but rather due to the 
initial role of the state in many African countries as the biggest employer (Roberts & Bellecombe 1967:xii) 
who could pursue an exemplary industrial relations policy. Indeed before the 1980’s, that is, prior to the 
introduction of structural adjustment programmes across many African countries, some form of public 
employment (either in the public service or in state enterprises) was big and crucial enough to play a pattern 
setting role in industrial relations both in terms of wages and employment conditions (Fashoyin 1992:5-6). 
In fact, in some cases like Tanzania and Mozambique, due to the abolition of private ownership of means 
of production, the state had become the only actor in formal economy, thus, its potential to regulate and 
shape industrial relations was absolute (Mlimka 2010:5-6, Pitcher 2007:138). Obviously in the immediate 
aftermath of independence in all African countries a large part of employment had remained informal and 
this sector could be partly and  indirectly regulated through pattern setting effects of public employment 
and only consistent government policies of inspection and training had in the long term potential to reduce 
the size of informal sector. Page ● 22
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In short, the most prominent initial role of the state in industrial relations in Africa, despite the differ-
ences in economic systems, was that of a benevolent employer who, at least in theory, motivated by the goal 
of economic improvement inspired by developmentalism (Damachi 1992:15). Although informal sector 
was quite substantial, gradual expansion of formal employment through rational investments , training and 
inspections was at least a possibility.
However, after the introduction of structural adjustment programmes in the 1980’s, privatizations and 
drastic reductions in public expenditure have substantially reduced the role of the state as an employer 
and this inevitably undermined the pattern setting inﬂ  uence of public  employment in almost all African 
countries. In fact, it is claimed that neo-liberal policies of last decades, not only discredited developmen-
talist economic agenda, which had a clear perspective on the way in which industrial relations should be 
regulated (through collective representation of interests which would render some state-dominated form of 
corporatism possible) but they also have  had a detrimental effect on the capacity of the state to effectively 
implement and inspect any kind of industrial relations policy (Peet & Hartwick 1999) and severely under-
mined the ability of African states to independently determine and pursue consistent economic and social 
programmes. Thus, one might argue that after the late 1980’s  African states, to a large extent, lost their 
capacity to remain as noteworthy actors in industrial relations (Wood & Brewster 2007:4).
However, we are of the opinion that, although these observations are not incorrect, the picture is not 
necessarily so bleak for the capacity of African states to play a prominent role in industrial relations dynam-
ics. For despite remarkable reduction (and in some cases an embargo on) public employment (Gockel 2009), 
working for the central or local governments, as we reveal in the next section, is still the most prominent 
form of formal employment in Africa, and given that certain services like health, education and security 
are unlikely to be privatized entirely, this will remain so in the foreseeable future. Thus, the role of the state 
in Africa as an important employer persists. Although now the way in which this role is played is mostly 
determined by the concerns of cost-effectiveness and HRM practices ( Dioh 2010:21, Mlimka 2010:20, 
Fajana 2010:23-25), this does not rule out the possibility that public employment might gradually assume a 
positively pattern setting role in terms of wages and employment conditions. 
Having this background in mind, one may argue that in Africa the most important way in which the state 
is involved in industrial relations, at least for now, is through regulation, enforcement and coordination. We 
can point out four important channels through which this occurs.Page ● 23
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First, quite often the state acquires a crucial capacity for inﬂ  uencing industrial relations through mini-
mum wage systems.  Most African countries have a long tradition of minimum wages which in some cases 
were inherited from the colonial period or introduced shortly after the independence (Alby et al 2005). 
These early wage setting schemes were further enhanced by the incomes policies of 1970’s in some coun-
tries, like Nigeria and Kenya, and they proved to be resilient (and perhaps inevitable) enough to survive the 
decades of neo-liberal policies and hostility of international agencies (Fashoyin 2010, Fajana 2010:12). In 
most African countries minimum wage councils and wage boards system are closely intertwined with the 
mechanisms of Tripartism, that is, representatives of trade unions and employers too are also involved in 
the determination of wages. However, in most of the cases the input of social partners should be consid-
ered essentially advisory and ﬁ  nal decision remains as the prerogative of the state. To this observation one 
should also add that  the most general form of minimum wage  appears to be the monolithic wage system 
that determines a single level that applies to all sectors or allows for a  limited differentiation across regions 
(rural and urban) or sectors (agriculture and industry)3. Given that, in virtually all African countries, these 
rather monolithic minimum wage systems, which are de facto ruled by governments, provide the basic ﬂ  oor 
in collective bargaining negotiations, one can argue that the state is a crucial actor in formal industrial rela-
tions who dictates the initial point in the most important item of bargaining agenda. In fact, this role of 
the state is quite prominent in some countries. For example, in Kenya collective bargaining agreements are 
valid only after their compliance with the wage guidelines is certiﬁ  ed by labour ministry or in Nigeria it is 
essentially a criminal offence for an employer to make wage increases that exceed designated percentages 
(Fashoyin 2010, Fajana 2010).  
Second, in many African countries, the state effectively retains the potential to control collective bar-
gaining due to statutory recognition protocols. This is because quite often collective bargaining requires 
some form of authorization by labour ministries. For example, almost in all countries both trade unions 
and employers’ organizations must be ofﬁ  cially recognized and registered by the state in order to engage in 
collective bargaining (see Stirling 2011:239). Moreover, in those countries where more than one trade union 
is allowed in a single workplace labour ministry determines the most representative union and grants bar-
gaining certiﬁ  cates, which can be withdrawn if the representativeness of trade unions is contested. Finally, 
in some cases, bargaining agreements become binding only after they are ofﬁ  cial approved by the ministry 
of labour, and this approval depends on the compliance of the agreements with technical requirements and, 
3  Of course in cases like South Africa and Kenya there are more detailed (i.e. sectoral) minimum wages, and a similar system has 
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as mentioned above, with policy guidelines. It is also important to note that in some countries like Senegal 
ofﬁ  cials of labour ministry are required to be present during the bargaining negotiations in order to facili-
tate agreements, a role which might easily be used in order to inﬂ  uence the dynamics of negotiations (Dioh 
2010:16). All these statutory obligations reveal that African states acquire the potential to prevent certain 
collective actors from engaging in bargaining, and this potential can also be used for inﬂ  uencing the bargain-
ing processes and outcomes. This implies that African states have the ability  to regulate, and if necessary 
steer, collective bargaining, thus the dynamics of industrial relations in accordance with their priorities. 
However, it should be noted that the existence of this potential does not imply that it has been effectively 
used. In general these recognition and approval protocols seem to be perceived as routine formalities by 
social partners. It is also important at this point to mention that, although African states have legal instru-
ments that might allow them to inﬂ  uence (or even steer) the collective bargaining processes, their ability to 
monitor the compliance of employers with the basic conditions of employment regulation (working hours, 
prohibition of child labour, etc.) remains rather limited due to their insufﬁ  cient inspection capacity (Alby et 
al 2005). Thus, one might argue that collective bargaining, by de facto delegating the inspection task to trade 
unions,  allows these states to compensate their inability to strictly implement basic employment regulations 
which are vital for the long term prosperity of society.  
Third, increasingly African states promote smooth functioning of collective bargaining mechanisms 
so as to avoid industrial conﬂ  ict, and consequently during the last decade in many countries, like Tanza-
nia, Nigeria and Kenya new dispute resolution mechanisms have been introduced which usually require 
involvement of labour ministries prior to bringing the cases before industrial courts (Mlimka 2010:60, Fa-
jana 2010:16, Fashoyin 2010:7-8). In fact, industrial conﬂ  ict and protest have been quite common in some 
African countries, especially during the periods of rapid privatization and austerity measures in the last two 
decades. Moreover, in some countries like Ghana, electoral cycles seems to have been coupled with indus-
trial action periods in public sector, indicating susceptibility of government to public resentment prior to 
elections (Gockel 2009). Of course lengthy and cumbersome dispute resolution mechanisms too have been 
one of the causes of industrial conﬂ  ict. However, recent legal changes, for example in Nigeria, indicate that 
African states  not only want to ease and accelerate dispute resolution so as to prevent overt conﬂ  ict, but 
they also seem to give more prominent role to arbitration and mediation mechanisms, which function under 
the auspices of labour ministries or local governments (Alby et al 2005:3, Fajana 2010:16). This choice of 
prioritizing the role of government rather than that of  judiciary in dispute resolution indicates the willing-Page ● 25
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ness (and increasing capacity) of African states to steer industrial bargaining outcomes in accordance with 
their economic and social policies.   
Finally, the role of the state in industrial relations can also be observed in the way in which Tripartism 
functions in Africa. During the last two decades tripartite commissions have played quite a prominent role 
in enactment of new legislations in different African countries. Although in some cases like South Africa 
and Tanzania these forums were genuinely “tripartite” at least for some time (Budlender 2009:19, Mlimka 
2010: 35-36), tripartism in countries like in Senegal and Cameroon often takes the form of irregular advi-
sory gatherings that provide the required legitimacy for government policies which, during the course of 
these meetings, are explained to (and to a lesser degree inﬂ  uenced by the positions of) social partners (Dioh 
2010:22, Nanfosso 2009:19) . Thus, one may argue that, on the one hand, the fact that governments during 
the last decade have been feeling the need to establish tripartite councils, for example like in Nigeria (Fajana 
2010:15), in order to be aware of the positions of trade unions and employers’ organizations indicates that 
the role of collective actors in Africa should not be underestimated, but on the other hand, the advisory 
and quite often irregular nature of tripartite councils hints that African states are inclined to and capable 
of regulating industrial relations alone. In fact, as we argue below, the fact that the collective bargaining in 
public service in many African countries such as Tanzania, Senegal, Nigeria and Kenya is hampered and 
bypassed by civil service codes, ad-hoc mechanisms and government decrees may be considered as another 
indication of this inclination (Mlimka 2010, Dioh 2010, Fajana 2010, Fashoyin 2010). 
Thus, one may argue that although public employment has been shrinking due to privatizations and 
reductions in public expenditure, and the ability of many states to enforce basic employment regulations 
remains limited, the state in Africa is still a crucial actor in industrial relations that retains the potential to 
inﬂ  uence and even manipulate collective bargaining processes through minimum wage systems, registration 
and approval protocols, dispute resolution mechanisms and tripartite councils.
Trade Unions
in Africa during the entire post war period trade unions have been crucial actors whose inﬂ  uence  ex-
ceeded beyond the realm of industrial relations and whose attitude and demands always surprised the ruling 
elite (see Pitcher 2007, Stirling 2011). As we examined in the previous section, in many African countries 
unions have been established during the colonial period and were legally recognized by the authorities in an 
attempt to prevent resentment generated within employment relations from being mobilized for political 
purposes. However, trade unions deﬁ  ed this logic of paciﬁ  cation and have played crucial roles in the strug-Page ● 26
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gles for independence (Cooper 1996, Orr 1966). In the immediate aftermath of independence trade union-
ists, thanks to their organizational skills and experience in policy making, have been recruited for important 
government positions (Horwitz 2007:221) though in contrast to this, in the same period trade union move-
ment in its entirety quite often failed to remain representative for the demands of their members nor were 
they very effective in formulation of government policies. Instead, in many African countries trade unions 
were considered and used as instruments of governance and propaganda at the hand of the ruling elite. 
However, during the 1990’s African unions once again proved to be capable of reﬂ  ecting the aspirations of 
working people and began to demand democratization and plurality (Horwitz 2007:229). In some cases like 
South Africa and Zambia the role of unions in bringing radical and democratic change through peaceful 
means is quite well-known (see Adler & Webster 1995, Pitcher 2007), but this role of trade unions as the 
agents of democratization during the course of last two decades was by no means exceptional in Africa.
To comprehend the position of trade unions in African industrial relations better, however, to this 
picture one should add the implications of the changes that took place in production relations across the 
world since the late 1970’s. The shift from vertically integrated production processes into globally dispersed 
production chains that operate on the basis of subcontract relations which promote cost reduction and 
ﬂ  exibility had a substantial impact on trade unions across Africa. Gradually, industries, such as garment 
and textile sector, have lost their competitiveness in the presence of cheap products of East Asia in many 
African countries  (Horowitz 2007:231) - though some countries like  Lesotho and Mauritius managed to 
keep up with the race (Pitcher 2007:148)- and in this environment developmentalist agendas which have 
been pursued in most African countries since their independence failed to produce industrial infrastructures 
that might allow African economies to obtain foreign currency reserves through exports, which would then 
enable them to sustain public expenditures and make use of their rich resources (Peet & Hartwick 1999).Page ● 27
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Table 2: Union Density in selected African countries
year within wage earners within  total employment
Cameroon 2008 NA 16 %
Egypt 2007 26.1 % 16.1 %
Etiopia 2007 12.9 % 1 %
Ghana 2006 70 % NA
Kenya 2007 35.5 % 4.1 %
Malawi 2006 20.6 % 2.7 %
Mauritius 2007 28.2 % 14.8 %
Niger 2008 NA 1.1 %
Sierra Leone 2008 46.8 % 3.6 %
South Africa 2008 39.8 % 24.9 %
Tanzania 2009 18.7 % 2.2 %
Uganda 2005 NA 1.1 %
Source: Hayter & Stoevska 2010
Consequently, as developmentalist agendas have been abandoned, privatizations began reducing the 
employment in state enterprises which had been hitherto the bastion of unionism across Africa, export 
processing zones where associational rights are constrained began to emerge in crucial locations, and, the 
number of hostile private employers began to increase, trade unions lost substantial part of their constitu-
ency and potential members. This naturally undermined ﬁ  nancial resources of trade unions as well and 
thus reduced their capacity to formulate revitalization strategies. Therefore trade union density within total 
employment remains rather low in majority of African countries as depicted in table 2.
Obviously this picture of gradually shrinking organized industrial relations is valid for some other parts 
of the world as well but what makes the situation more alarming for African trade unions is the fact that 
informal employment, as mentioned above, had always been prevalent in Africa. With the emergence of 
new ﬂ  exible modes of production, trade unions for example in Western Europe were threatened by cheap 
production alternatives far away and this at least added to the calculation of employers the shipment costs. 
However, in the case of Africa, the large informal sector offered multitude of immediately available ﬂ  exible 
and “cost-effective” production options to employers, thus further deteriorated the conditions for trade 
unions by triggering the processes of casualization and informalization of labour which accelerate the ex-
pansion of informal employment at the expense of formal jobs (see Stirling 2011:236). Therefore, one may 
argue that gradually one of the characteristic features of trade unionism in Africa has become its permanent 
occupation with the prospects of organizing informal economy or ﬁ  nding ways to cope with the detrimental 
impact of informal employment on the organized industrial relations. Page ● 28
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Another important development for trade unions in Africa has been the process of gradual democrati-
zation in political systems that began to occur during the course of 1990’s and 2000’s (Horwitz 2007:221). 
As mentioned in the previous section, trade unions were one of the prominent actors in this trend in coun-
tries like Senegal, Niger, Ghana, Zambia , Namibia and South Africa (Kraus 2007). However, interestingly, 
as the constraints imposed on the freedom of association and speech by single party governments and au-
thoritarian elites have been gradually removed from across Africa, trade unions started to suffer another and 
perhaps unexpected decline in their power that resulted from proliferation of new worker organizations, 
civil society actors and social movements which began to appear in the public space. In fact, now trade un-
ions, perhaps ﬁ  rst time in their history, need to struggle not only for the attention of the state or recognition 
by employers but they must also compete for the attention of their own actual and potential constituency in 
the presence of alternative channels of interest representation promoted by NGO’s, ad-hoc mobilizations, 
social movements international networks, and of course by new trade unions (Pitcher 2007). 
This development, which may be called “the plurality paradox”, has three implications. Firstly, when it 
comes to aggregation and articulation of workers’ grievances in the political realm, that is, essential func-
tions of central trade union organizations, now in some African countries  there is no longer single and 
uncontested peak labour organization which can forcefully claim to be “the” representative of workers’ 
interests and can conﬁ  dently demand concessions from the state and employers. Due to increasing number 
of trade unions with small membership ﬁ  gures there are alternative peak organizations or there are too 
many conﬂ  icted interests within single organizations which prevent trade union movements from asserting 
their position and claims forcefully in political arena or in tripartite commissions. Secondly, at the workplace 
level, trade unions face the danger of exhausting their resources in struggle with other unions for bargain-
ing rights. This situation in some countries proved to be capable of triggering actual ﬁ  ghts among workers. 
Finally, trade unions are compelled to assess the positions of and develop policies about organizations 
which are not traditional industrial relations’ actors and were hitherto undeﬁ  ned or unknown in unions’ 
strategic outlooks, such as NGO’s, mutual-help associations, social movements and international networks. 
Under these circumstances, due to lack of experience or suspicion unions may opt for simple strategies of 
avoidance or even outright hostility in their relations with these new actors , and thus may miss potentially 
important channels of improvement for their members as depicted in the interaction between private labour 
law actors  and trade unions in the cut-ﬂ  ower industry in East Africa (see Riisgaard 2008).Page ● 29
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Once again, however, all these observations should not obscure the fact that trade unions in Africa, in 
spite of all these threats posed by new production regimes and paradoxes generated by the political climate, 
continue to exist and in some sectors like horticulture even expand their membership. Moreover, despite 
all the difﬁ  culties, in some African countries like Sierre Leone, South Africa and Democratic Republic of 
Congo, they score remarkable successes in organization of informal sector ( Stirling 2011:239-241,Mugumo 
2011:36-37), to the extent that in some countries like Senegal employers operating in informal sector feel the 
need to establish their own organizations in order to secure their interests collectively, a typical sign of grow-
ing strength of organized labour.  In fact from a purely technical perspective it is not imprudent to argue 
that in some capital intensive sectors like petroleum , gas and mining trade unions still do not feel insecure 
despite privatizations and lay-offs (see Erapi 2011: 56-58), and even in worst circumstances trade unionism 
in Africa would ﬁ  nd refuge in some basic public services like health and education which, as mentioned 
above, cannot be entirely privatized. Moreover some of the rising branches of services in private sector such 
as telecommunications and banking too may provide fertile grounds for trade unions to expand. 
Employers’ Organizations
During the colonial period native Africans had been, to a large extent, banned from entrepreneurship 
and this can be one of the reasons behind the large informal sector in Africa, which essentially consists of 
small and micro scale enterprises of native employers. 
After the independence, the prominent or absolute role of the state as an employer too once again left 
the private entrepreneurship underdeveloped especially in those African countries where Marxist economic 
policies were pursued, like Mozambique and Tanzania. On the other hand, in some case like Egypt, Tunisia 
and Senegal, employers’ organizations have been established during the ﬁ  rst half of 20th century hinting the 
existence of vibrant private sector activities (Michael 1992:33). However in general one can argue that Afri-
can employers’ organization have emerged relatively late and they were quite often established in response 
to growing strength of trade unions.
In Africa, like elsewhere, the nature of employers’ organizations is more complicated than that of trade 
unions. For example there are associations which are solely occupied with business interests of their afﬁ  li-
ates or there are quasi-ofﬁ  cial chambers where afﬁ  liation is mandatory for all employers. And of course, 
there are associations which in some way represent interests of employers within industrial relations institu-
tions. One can distinguish three types of the latter in Africa. First, there are advisory organizations which 
do not participate in collective bargaining negotiations but on request from their afﬁ  liates provide some Page ● 30
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guidance, and second, there are employers’ organization which directly and regularly engage with trade 
unions on behalf of their members. Finally, in recent years employers in informal sector too appear to be 
interested in collective interest representation, signalling the emergence of yet another type of employers’ 
organization. Differences between these organizational choices, as we argue below, may be explained by the 
extent to which employers desire to coordinate their actions. 
However, among the employers, the most important group, whose inﬂ  uence on industrial relations quite 
often exceed that of employers’ organizations is multinational corporations. Indeed, not only in capital in-
tensive sectors such as gas  mining and petroleum but also in service industries such as telecommunications 
and banking, prominent multinational companies and foreign investors have entered African market dur-
ing the last decade. One may argue that impact of the employment policies of these actors would be quite 
inﬂ  uential in the way in which employers’ organizations across Africa determine their own positions within 
organized industrial relations. 
In the next section, having this background about the general features of industrial relations’ actors in 
mind, we will examine the characteristics of the environment, that is, the labour market, in which these ac-
tors must operate.Page ● 31
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4.  Labor Market in Africa
Organized industrial relations in African countries cannot be understood without examining the na-
ture and dynamics of labor markets and the functional relationships between different segments and 
types of employment. Needless to say that labor markets, and the way in which their various segments are 
connected,have peculiarities in each African country but by examining the common characteristics of labor 
market segmentation across the continent one can acknowledge the speciﬁ  city of country-level responses. 
Thus in ﬁ  gure 2 we provide an analytical picture, which reveals common trends and patterns of labor mar-
ket segmentation in order to clarify the conditions under which actors and institutions of organized indus-
trial relations  operate in African context. 
Before commencing the exploration of this analytical picture, however, it is important to keep in mind 
that during the last decade the general economic performance in Africa, that is, the performance of labour 
markets that are generically depicted in ﬁ  gure 2, has been positively surprising. Between 2004 and 2008 
sub-Saharan Africa  “outperformed the more advanced economies, by achieving growth rates around 6.5 
percent, compared with a world average of 4.5 percent” (ILO 2010:2). In fact, quite recently it is  argued 
that  “for the ﬁ  rst time in almost three decades ordinary Africans have some disposable income” (Schoe-
man 2011:49) and consequently “the availability of, and the demand for, consumer goods have  never been 
greater” (Pitcher 2007:136). However, this potential, which might be partly curbed by global ﬁ  nancial crisis, 
is not without its problems, because it was not translated into poverty reduction or employment creation nor 
there has been substantial decline in income inequality (ILO 2011).  
Yet it is clear from this recent experience that African economies are capable of generating  steady 
growth and this implies that with appropriate policies and institutional arrangements  economic growth can 
be channeled into job creation, poverty reduction and may be translated into sustainable improvement in 
living conditions. Hence is the necessity to  scrutinize the way in which labor market depicted in ﬁ  gure 2 
operates.Page ● 32
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Informal Sector and organized industrial relations
First feature that we need to focus in ﬁ  gure 2 is the demarcation between formal and informal economy, 
a division which captures the common denominator of labor markets in African countries. In order to 
comprehend the implications of this division for organized industrial relations we should make four obser-
vations.
First, almost everywhere in Africa employment in informal sector outnumbers that in formal economy 
with a large margin. For example, in Madagascar and  Democratic Republic of Congo more than 90 percent 
of people are employed in informal economy so that formal employment and organized industrial relations 
appear truly exceptional in these countries (Heinz and Valodia 2008, Mugumo 2011:7). However, there is 
also the case of South Africa where informal labor market is relatively small. There formal employment 
accounts for more than 60 percent of total employment and there is strong collective representation by 
social partners (Budlender 2009:4). If we look at the average values rather than these extremes, we see that   
informal employment in north Africa equals to almost half of total employment and in sub-Saharan Africa 
it approaches to 70 percent of the total (ILO 2008:3). 
This prevalence of informal sector may lead one to overlook the advantages and perhaps the relevance 
of organized industrial relations for African workers . Indeed it  is  sometimes argued, at least theoretically, 
that employment in informal economy may be a “voluntary” choice (Fields 1990, Maloney 2004). That 
is, informal employment does not necessarily imply poverty and occasionally it may even generate more 
income than formal employment. However, at least within African context, and especially as long as wage Page ● 33
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earners and self-employed individuals are concerned, beyond the obvious disadvantage of being  deprived 
from social protection those who are employed in informal economy thus not represented by trade unions 
or covered by collective bargaining also earn less than formally employed workers . For example, detailed 
wage analyses in Burundi and Senegal reveals that this wage differential may be somewhere between 22 to 
38 percent (ILO 2010:12). Against this background, workers in informal sector are expected to welcome 
social protection and improvement in work conditions that would accompany formal employment and col-
lective representation (Chen 2008:16). In this regard, it is important to note that statistical evidence fails 
to conﬁ  rm  simple neo-classical explanations which tend to point out extensive regulation as prime reason 
for the prevalence and expansion of informal employment in Africa (Kucera & Roncolato 2008: 334-341). 
In short, although informal employment is a common and disconcerting fact of labor markets across 
African countries and poses a serious challenge for organized industrial relations, it is an established fact 
that organized industrial relations generate better employment conditions and wages for workers. There is 
no implicit logic which motivates African workers to voluntarily seek informal employment.    
Second important feature of the divide between formal and informal employment for the dynamics of 
organized industrial relations is that this division is actually quite ambiguous. Because  both enterprises and 
individuals may simultaneously operate in both sides of the demarcation line. For example, in Morocco for-
mal enterprises often use unregistered workers as a part of their labor force in order to maintain a degree of 
numerical ﬂ  exibility (Meknassi & Rioux 2010:18). In fact this practice appears to be common across Africa   
(ILO 2008:15).   However, as a typical feature of African labor markets, there are also many individuals who 
are employed in formal jobs and simultaneously retain an informal occupation (not necessarily wage employ-
ment) in order to ensure their livelihood. This pattern was especially prevalent in those periods when  public 
employees suffered from massive salary reductions as a result of austerity measures dictated by structural 
adjustment programmes. For example, both Niger and Cameroon during the 1990’s  witnessed almost 30 
percent reduction in public wages which enforced many individuals to involve in informal economy in some 
way (Nanfasso 2009:10, Adji 2000:3). On the other hand, in the case of Democratic Republic of Congo, due 
to very low and precarious wages, simultaneous employment in formal and informal economy appears to be 
only strategy which enables workers to have sufﬁ  cient income for subsistence (Mugumo 2011:43)
In fact, besides the fact that the line that separates formal and informal economy is rather blurred, these 
two segments are, in many African countries, functionally connected. In its most simple form this connec-
tion emerges, as mentioned above, when formal enterprises keep some workers out of books or hire them Page ● 34
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for very short durations. This practice generates a gradual process of casualization of labor, which while 
enabling employers to make use of (especially unskilled) labor as soon as and as long as necessary without 
any social or ﬁ  nancial commitments, it prevents trade union formation and suppresses accumulation and 
rationalization of workers’ demands. In this respect Nigerian petroleum industry is a typical case where it 
is common to hire workers on almost daily basis, paying them after the daily shift, and releasing them after 
maximum three months (Fajana 2010:6). This obviously precludes any prospects of collective organization 
and bargaining. Interestingly, this pattern is not necessarily conﬁ  ned to private sector and does not necessar-
ily serve purely proﬁ  t oriented motives. For example, in Ghana, due to strict constraints imposed on public 
employment by structural adjustment programmes, the use of casual workers remained as the only option 
in order to sustain some essential services. Indeed this very pattern seems to have led to statutory acknowl-
edgment of casual employment in Ghana, that is, the new labor law of 2003 acknowledges that “contract 
of casual worker need not to be in writing” though the same law makes it mandatory for employers to allow   
casual workers to beneﬁ  t from medical services of workplaces and entitles them to equal payment  (Gockel 
2009:59). 
Although casualization is considered one of the prime sources of erosion of trade unions and collec-
tive bargaining in Africa, subcontract relations generate  much more sophisticated links between formal and 
informal economy and trigger the process of informalization as depicted in ﬁ  gure 2. Increasing demand, 
permanent concern with cost reduction and desire to avoid administrative requirements of  extra person-
nel (ILO 2008: 19) lead formal ﬁ  rms to outsource some part of their production into entirely or semi 
informal enterprises which, in turn, make further outsourcing within informal economy (Gallin 2001:534, 
Chen 2007:7-8). This process establishes a value chain through which production processes that commence 
in formal ﬁ  rms, or even in foreign countries, are  spread  across informal economy (see Koçer & Fransen 
2009:243, Riisgaard 2008:327-328) . This does not only allow enterprises to proﬁ  t from low wages and 
vulnerability of informal workers but also encourages  entrepreneurs to operate in the informal economy. 
Hence the process of informalization is generated. In fact informalization is a permanent threat for the job 
security of African workers  thus it constraints union demands on wages and working conditions. 
Final point about formal/informal divide that is of crucial signiﬁ  cance for organized industrial relations 
is that neither side of this demarcation is homogeneous.  This may be clear for the formal part, that is, here 
there is at least the differentiation between private and public formal employment, but it has been increas-
ingly clear that informal economy  in Africa, too, is quite an heterogeneous landscape which contains many Page ● 35
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layers distinguished from each other by the nature of employment relationship, connections with formal 
economy, potential earnings and precariousness. In fact the lack of clarity in the nature of employment is a 
deﬁ  ning feature of informal economy in Africa (Chen 2007) 
As depicted in ﬁ  gure 2 we have the clear differentiation between wage-employment in  informal small 
& micro enterprises  and self-employment. However this dichotomy should not conceal the fact that quite 
often micro enterprises essentially operate not on the basis of wage relationships but on the basis of unpaid 
family labor, and although street vendors constitute a large segment of self-employed population, there is 
a growing sector of home-working that counts as self-employment but contains many people who work 
essentially for remote entrepreneurs on the basis of very precarious relationship as de-facto wage earners 
(Gallin 2001:535). The production potential of these obscure employment relationships that connect infor-
mal economy with formal enterprises threatens especially the low and semi skilled jobs in the formal sector, 
and thus undermines organized industrial relations by shrinking recruitment base of trade unions.   
One should also not overlook much more subtle processes that create unpaid labor and emerge out of 
the interaction between traditions and contemporary trends. In this respect the practice of impoverished 
and quite often rural families to send their children to urban families to be used as domestic laborers (quite 
often to settle the family debts) appears to be generating yet another under-class within informal sector. Be-
cause increasingly these underage female workers are also used outside households by their host families as 
unpaid workers.  This transformation in the nature of “traditional” child-labor gradually becomes the norm 
across Africa (Akurang-Parry 2010:29). 
 In this sense perhaps one of the most alarming features of African labor market that should be taken 
very seriously by the proponents of organized industrial relations is that not only women are more likely to 
ﬁ  nd employment in the informal economy compared to men but they are also employed in the lower-end 
of informal jobs in terms of earnings and continuity. Thus, as the degree of precariousness increases within 
informal economy the proportion of female employees, too, rises4 (Chen 2008). Therefore, any actor who 
attempts to make organized industrial relations relevant for informal sector should devise strategies in order 
to overcome the obstacles that prevent female workers from participating in collective representation.
However, it is important to avoid drawing a bleak picture given that there is a large organizational po-
tential embedded in informal economy  as depicted in ﬁ  gure 2, which can be used by the proponents of 
4  This  gradual  feminization of  informal  employment is more prominent in sub-Saharan Africa compared to north African 
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organized industrial relations in order to improve work conditions and to transform mutually harmful con-
nections between formal and informal sectors. 
Trade unions in many African countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Senegal, Ghana and South Africa, at-
tempt to organize workers in informal enterprises. Although the inability of informal workers to pay union 
fees or to wait for long term improvements that would follow union membership appear to be hindering 
fast developments, it is increasingly clear for trade unionists in Africa that “building trade union strength 
internationally depends on the organization of informal sector” (Gallin 2001:532). 
Fortunately, trade unions are not alone in this endeavor. NGO’s too are involved in organizing informal 
workers and empowering unionists for operating in the informal sector. For example, despite the precarious 
nature of political and economic environment, in Democratic Republic of Congo , with the help of NGO’s 
from Belgium, a trade union (CSC: Confederation Syndicate of Congo) managed to recruit almost 200.000 
workers from informal sector (Mugumo 2011:37). Similarly, in Ghana two important trade unions, namely, 
Ghana Private Road Sector Transport Union and General Agricultural Workers Union, try to organize in-
formal workers by converting social welfare clubs of these workers into organizations that are concerned 
with economic and political issues (Gockel 2009:68-69). 
Perhaps more importantly there are also serious attempts of self- organization among informal workers 
in Africa. Indeed during the last three decades even the most vulnerable individuals working in informal 
economy organized  themselves internationally and established contacts with trade unions and NGO’s in 
order to improve their conditions (Chen 2008, Goldman 2003, Batliwala 2002). 
Thus, one may cautiously argue that in labor markets across Africa, given the mutual dependency of 
formal and informal modes of employment and the latter’s organizational potential, dynamics of organized 
industrial relations will gradually become more relevant for workers in informal sector, and in turn, orga-
nizational innovations of these workers will affect the way in which formal sector operates on the basis of 
labor law and collective bargaining.  
Formal Sector and organized industrial relations
Now, let’s focus on the upper half of ﬁ  gure 2 which  depicts the layers within formal economy in Afri-
can countries. Here the most obvious distinction is between public and the private employment. In public 
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employment, and ﬁ  nally, public employment at the service of central governments. Let’s elaborate on the 
general features of these segments.
Historically, state owned enterprises have been crucial for the dynamics of African political economy 
and industrial relations not only because of the share of formal employment they accounted for or goods 
they produced but also due to political functions they fulﬁ  lled. Many African governments in the immediate 
aftermath of independence considered the establishment of public enterprises vital for developmentalist 
economic agenda but they also regarded emergence of a wage-labor class whose interests directly linked to 
ruling party desirable to ensure their political legitimacy (Pitcher 2007:138, Elsenhans 1991:78-81). Quite 
often these enterprises have been major drivers of urbanization (Olowu 2003:43) and soon  they have be-
come the bastions of organized industrial relations as they provided recruiting grounds for trade unions. 
However, with the launch of structural adjustment programmes after the economic crisis of 1970’s there 
has been major decline in the  number of state owned enterprises across Africa (Horwitz 2007:223). In some 
cases this was rather radical. For example, Zambia privatized 261 of its 282  public enterprises during the 
period of 1990-2005 and in one of the most “successful”  privatization programmes Mozambique govern-
ment sold 1200 public enterprises to private sector  within merely six years (Pitcher 2007:144-145). In a 
similarly fast paced privatization  approximately 160 public enterprises have been rapidly sold in Cameroon 
since 1999 (Nanfosso 2009). 
Against this background one may argue that, from the perspective of organized industrial relations, state 
enterprises in Africa  belong to past, and thus, are of no signiﬁ  cance  for the current dynamics of labor 
market. However, one should still acknowledge that, despite their declining numbers or complete extinction,   
the very existence of public enterprises with their favorable working conditions and relatively generous 
remuneration schemes in public memory should not be underestimated as a factor which might - at least 
in short and middle term- exert some inﬂ  uence on the formation of individuals’ expectations in terms of 
employment conditions, job security and wages (see Kelly 1998). 
In fact, due to gradual demise of state enterprises as a result of  privatization programmes of last two 
decades, services in local and central government remained as the only remarkable domains of  public 
employment in many African countries. However, as indicated in ﬁ  gure 2, quite often these two levels of 
government employment are different enough to be treated as two distinct segments of public employment. Page ● 38
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One reason for this differentiation is that many African countries, as one of the conditions imposed by 
donor countries, have initiated decentralization programmes in order to empower local governments so as 
to attain a higher level of “good” governance. In this respect some countries like Nigeria, Uganda and Mali, 
explicitly adopted the strategy of democratization by a bottom-up process, and thus, launched democratic 
decentralization programmes, which envisaged transfer of resources from central to local government and 
allowed various interactions between local governments and non-governmental actors, such as NGO’s and 
trade unions, in realization of the tasks of governance (Olowu 2003: 41-42). These dynamics naturally ren-
dered employment at the service of local authorities different from employment in central government in 
terms of work conditions and effectiveness of collective bargaining.
Distinctive nature of employment in central government also results from the absence of collective 
bargaining in some sectors. In fact, in many African countries, such as Tanzania and  Ghana, public services 
such as public security, health and transport are excluded from collective bargaining for the sake of ensuring 
public interest. However, besides this pattern there are other countries like Senegal, Nigeria and Tanzania 
where public employment in central government is regulated more by civil service codes or ad-hoc decrees 
than collective bargaining (Dioh 2010:21, Mlimka 2010:20, Fajana 2010:23-25). One reason for this de facto 
exclusion is the willingness of governments to make use of HRM practices in order to  ‘rationalize’ public 
service, an idea which appears to be inspired by the permanent occupation of structural adjustment pro-
grammes with the size and efﬁ  cient use of public expenditure. Another reason (for example in Ghana) is 
the complicated and differentiated remuneration schemes in public services which consists of various salary 
components and packages. To alter these schemes is quite a sensitive task, which probably makes govern-
ments reluctant towards collective bargaining (Gockel 2009:64).   
Of course, the reluctance of governments to relinquish their ability to adjust the size of public employ-
ment as they see ﬁ  t is another reason for the limited incursion of collective bargaining in some countries, 
like Senegal, Nigeria, Tanzania, into central government employment. 
Consequently,  it is not uncommon to observe quite different and even contradictory  industrial rela-
tions dynamics in the same country at these two levels of government. In this respect perhaps the most 
striking example recently occurred in Kenya. There the government, after lengthy negotiations with trade 
unions and almost at the moment of agreement on the introduction of collective bargaining, decided to 
step back, and retained its reliance on regulation of public employment by strict code and unilateral decrees 
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However, these observations should not lead one to conclude that in African countries  organized in-
dustrial relations are generally weak in public sector. On the contrary in many countries we observe the exact 
opposite pattern, that is, there public employment (then both at central and local levels) is the bastion of or-
ganized industrial relations and collective bargaining, to the extent that dynamics of electoral politics affect 
the terms of bargaining. For example in Ghana, before the regulatory changes in 2003 that introduced non-
adversarial reconciliation practices,  increasing number of strikes were used to be regarded normal during 
the election years, a pattern which hinted that trade unions have  been conﬁ  dent  about the strength of col-
lective bargaining and legitimacy of collective interest representation in the public sector (Gockel 2009:72).
The other segment of formal employment, that is, private sector operating within formal economy (see 
ﬁ  gure 2), is dominated by large multinational companies which, during the last two decades gradually took 
over old state enterprises in oil, gas and mining industries (and in some cases also telecommunications) 
through privatizations (Erapi 2011, Wood & Brewster 2007:5-6). Native entrepreneurs quite often oper-
ate small ﬁ  rms and establishments, and usually do not have collective bargaining. An exception might be 
horticulture industry which consists of large farms in countries like Kenya and Tanzania which are largely 
unionized (Riisgaard 2008, Fashoyin 2010, Mlimka 2010).  
Private sector in many countries used to constitute the backbone of organized industrial relations. How-
ever African trade unions in this segment, due to employers’ hostility towards collective bargaining resulting 
from their permanent concern with costs and recently because of the slowdown caused by global ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, suffer from declining membership and are quite often compelled to curb their demands. On the other 
hand, during the last decade in many countries such as Kenya, Senegal, Ghana, and Tanzania new laws 
which facilitate trade unions’ operations and recognition have been introduced (Horwitz 2007, Fashoyin 
2010, Gockel 2009, Fajana 2010). 
In the next section, we will scrutinize how, and to what extent, industrial relations institutions enable 
governments, trade unions and employers’ organizations to operate in the labor market that we have exam-
ined so far.Page ● 40
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5.  Industrial Relations Processes: 
Collective Bargaining and Minimum 
Wage  
Although it is difﬁ  cult to draw a generic picture of collective bargaining in Africa, one can point out 
certain phases in this process which differ across countries and create variations in the continent. The very 
ﬁ  rst step in bargaining process is ofﬁ  cial recognition of trade unions by a state authority. This, almost as 
a general rule, requires registration of trade unions either by labour ministry or by some ofﬁ  cial registrar 
(see Gockel 2009:25, Nanfosso 2009:15). And often there are threshold conditions for registration as to 
the minimum number of workers to be recruited. Usually the registration rule also applies to employers’ 
organizations. The new laws in Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Egypt, Morocco, Zambia and Mauritius have reiter-
ated or introduced this statutory registration both for unions and employers’ organizations, and as we men-
tion above, this obligation might be used as an instrument of control or even veto by state authorities (see 
Horwitz 2007:228).  However, in practice this rule usually appears only as a formality and provides statutory 
backing for trade unions by compelling  employers to recognize registered unions as bargaining partners. 
The binding nature of collective agreements or legality of  industrial disputes too is further enhanced by 
this ofﬁ  cial registration procedure.  
In general, once a trade union is registered it can ofﬁ  cially demand from employers to be recognized as 
the bargaining agent for a workplace or industry. However, quite often trade unions  must also obtain  of-
ﬁ  cial  certiﬁ  cates which acknowledges their status as the bargaining agent for each workplace or industry. 
African countries differ in terms of whether more than one trade union can be the bargaining agent in the 
same workplace or enterprise. In some countries, the majority rule applies, that is, employers are obliged to 
negotiate with the most representative trade union. And they can challenge their bargaining partners on the 
ground that they no longer represent the majority. In other countries, all existing unions in the workplace 
take part in collective bargaining. In either case, the existence of multiple unions in the same workplace ap-
pears to be a potential source for internal strife among workers. 
Collective bargaining may take place between individual employers and trade unions. It is also possible 
that employers’ organizations, instead of merely providing advice, may directly negotiate with trade unions 
on behalf of their afﬁ  liates. In fact, whether employers’ organizations assume the role of bargaining agent 
appears to be one of the distinguishing features of industrial relations’ systems across Africa. One might ar-Page ● 42
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gue that direct involvement of employers’ organization in collective bargaining hints that there is a concern 
for coordination of bargaining and it also implies that trade unions acquire necessary expertise and strength 
to  effectively assert their demands.  
Dominant level of collective bargaining differs substantially across African countries. In some countries 
enterprise level bargaining is the normal mode while in others sectoral negotiations is the rule. Once again 
dominance of sectoral negotiations might be considered as an evidence for  concern with coordination, and 
also as indication of trade unions’ strength. Though,  especially in mining and oil sectors these two types 
of bargaining might take  place simultaneously as very large establishments prefer to engage in enterprise 
level bargaining in order to attain agreements which ﬁ  t into their peculiar conditions. On the other hand, 
especially in horticulture industry, there are multi-employer bargaining rounds, which are neither sectoral 
nor at the enterprise level. This, might point out intra-class interest differentiations among employers that 
may be generated by differentiation in demands of costumers of ﬁ  nal products.
Interestingly, in some countries there is also vertical differentiation in collective bargaining, that is, 
while most of the issues are determined at the sectoral level, the way in which they will be implemented or 
interpreted is negotiated at enterprise or workplace level. In some cases while general work conditions are 
determined at national level by an open-ended tripartite bargaining agreement, wage determination is left 
for sectoral or enterprise level negotiations. This kind of institutional arrangement hints that what is meant 
by collective agreement can be quite different across countries.  
Once collective agreement is attained, we see three different procedures across Africa which make the 
ﬁ  nal document legally binding: simple registration, conditional approval and unilateral imposition. The gen-
eral rule is that collective agreements must be registered at labour ministries, and this implies that the state 
has a degree of authority on agreements. Labour ministries in principle may refuse to approve collective 
agreements. Of course  this  may remain as a formality and ministries may just examine the ﬁ  nal document 
from a technical perspective. This variant may be called simple registration procedure. In majority of Afri-
can countries we have this protocol. However, there is another variation. In some countries labour ministries 
may refuse collective agreements if they fail to comply with predetermined wage guidelines. These guide-
lines have been inherited from the 1970’s income policies but they still remain as effective policy instruments 
of wage coordination in some countries like Nigeria and Kenya (Fashoyin 2010, Fajana 2010:12, 28). This 
may be seen conditional approval of collective agreements. Finally, in some systems, we have the unilateral 
imposition, that is, the  state can simply overrule the bargaining agreements and may impose wages and Page ● 43
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work conditions unilaterally in accordance with some ad-hoc policy or concern.
Table 3: Collective Bargaining Coverage in selected African countries  source: ILO Global Wage Report 
2010)
year within wage earners within  total employment
Egypt 2008 3.4  % 2.1 %
Ethiopia 2007 22.7 % 8.3 %
Ghana 2006 70 % NA
Kenya  2007 3.7 % 0.4 %
Malawi 2006 20.8 % 2.7 %
Mauritius 2008 16.5 % 9.9 %
Sierra Leone 2008 46.8 % 3.5 %
South Africa 2008 27.3 % 17.1 %
Sudan 2008 NA 0.2 %
Source: Hayter & Stoevska 2010
Although, power of authorities to refuse collective agreements may appear as a breach of the  basic 
rights of social partners and detrimental for collective bargaining, one might, from a purely technical per-
spective, interpret this as the acknowledgement of pattern setting inﬂ  uence of organized industrial relations 
especially in terms of wages.  This implies that, although the ofﬁ  cial coverage of bargaining is typically very 
low in African countries as depicted in table 3, its real impact on economies through dissemination of wage 
expectations might be quite substantial. 
However, this argument should not give the impression that collective bargaining agreements are the 
only pattern setting instruments in African economies. In fact, the basic and most effective coordination 
tool in virtually all African countries is minimum wage. In its most general  form the practice is that ﬁ  rst a 
single minimum wage is determined at national level by tripartite commission either for the entire labour 
market or for regions ( such as rural and urban areas) and for some broad sectors (such as agriculture 
and industry), and these minimum wages become legally binding for the  designated segments of the la-
bour market. However, there are other minimum wage mechanisms as well. For example in countries like 
South Africa and Kenya there are sectoral wage commissions consists of representative of employers, trade 
unions and governments which either determine minimum wages for their corresponding sector or they 
make a recommendation to labour ministry, which then chooses an appropriate wage level (Fashoyin 2010, 
Budlender 2009). Of course, given the prevalence of informal employment in all African countries, it is 
difﬁ  cult to argue that minimum wages are strictly  implemented in the entire labour market. However, in 
the absence of widespread collective bargaining it is established that, due to the lighthouse effects, wage dy-
namics are positively affected by minimum wage (Garga 2010:34). Therefore minimum wages are of crucial 
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should avoid thinking that the inﬂ  uence of minimum wage is constrained by the limits of formal employ-
ment. In fact even the World Bank, after almost three decades of blaming minimum wage for undermining 
competitiveness and reducing the job creation capacity of African economies, has acknowledged that mini-
mum wage in African countries has quite a positive impact on the living conditions of low-skilled workers 
and it prevents further  increases in income inequality (Murgai & Avallion 2005). In fact, due to its crucial 
role minimum wage appears to be high in the agenda of trade unions as they negotiate with governments 
(see Stirling 2011: 240).  
However, despite its dominant role in wage determination, minimum wage in African countries should   
not be seen as a substitute for collective bargaining. It is more appropriate to consider minimum wage and 
collective bargaining as complementary institutions which mutually enhance each other’s strength and le-
gitimacy. For in almost all countries minimum wage provides a starting point, a wage ﬂ  oor, for collective 
bargaining negotiations, thus, any increase in minimum wages would strengthen the position of worker 
representatives in bargaining negotiations,  enabling them to demand better wages or to concentrate their 
efforts on less adversarial issues and thus avoid disputes that might undermine the willingness of employ-
ers to participate in bargaining in good faith. In fact, mutual dependency of minimum wage and collective 
bargaining may lead to virtuous circles in coordination as well. For example in Tanzania, minimum wage 
boards as they make recommendations to the ministry of labour must take the wage levels determined  in 
collective bargaining agreements into account and in turn these agreements use recommended minimum 
wages as their wage ﬂ  oor (Mlimka 2010:47). This reciprocal impact, by expanding the inﬂ  uence of collective 
bargaining,  initiates wage dynamics which are likely to be beneﬁ  cial for workers. In fact, tripartite nature of 
minimum wage determination (or recommendation) either at national or sectoral level enhances the legiti-
macy of trade unions as crucial actors in political economy and these tripartite commissions, by regularly 
bringing social partners together, promote the idea of negotiated settlement of  economic and social issues.   
Although wage is the most crucial component of collective bargaining negotiations, it is by no means 
the most important subject that is negotiated. There are many other concerns of workers and employers 
that are included in bargaining agreements. For example in recent years health and safety standards have be-
come a very prominent topic in the bargaining negotiations in the horticulture industry in East Africa. The 
length of maternity (and increasingly paternity) leaves, nature of in-kind beneﬁ  ts, and the quality of medical 
facilities of workplaces too are common issues in collective bargaining rounds. However, perhaps the only 
non-wage is issue that is increasingly more included in collective bargaining agreements and which is pecu-Page ● 45
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liar to Africa is the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It is a sad fact that large percentages of working people in many 
African countries are infected with HIV and these workers quite often face discrimination in the labour 
market, or crippled by  requirements of medical treatments (Horowitz 2007:229). Therefore trade unions, 
in almost all sub-Saharan countries, began to secure certain rights for workers with HIV/AIDS. These may 
include employers’ coverage of medical expenses of workers and their families, strict rules against discrimi-
nation against these workers in hiring and ﬁ  ring procedures, and organization of  seminars and workshops 
in order to inform workers as to the ways in which they can avoid HIV/AIDS or learn to live with it without 
being socially isolated (Stirling 2011: 244, Budlender 2009:28)  
 Obviously, collective bargaining negotiations do not always smoothly lead to agreements. There are 
very often disputes about the way in which included issues are to be settled but also after the agreement 
there are usually grievances about the way in which the settlement is interpreted. After the recent changes 
in law, in many African countries like Morocco, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana dispute settlement procedures 
have been introduced or the existing procedures are rationalized and simpliﬁ  ed (Meknassi & Rioux 2010, 
Fajana 2010, Fashoyin 2010, Gockel 2009). Although some of these protocols are still quite cumbersome 
and slow, in general there is a tendency to establish smooth mediation and arbitration protocols which re-
quire appointment of independent arbitrators or ofﬁ  cials from labour ministries to settle disputes (Alby et 
al 2005:3). In some countries like Tanzania making application to industrial courts is permissible only after 
all attempts of arbitration and mediation fail (Mlimka 2010:60 ).  These new trends in dispute settlement 
indicates that in general African governments want to avoid or prevent industrial conﬂ  ict and instead they 
want to promote peaceful functioning of collective bargaining. However, this avoidance from and, in some 
case like Nigeria, prohibition of strikes (Fajana 2010: 29), may undermine workers’ conﬁ  dence in trade 
unions’ ability to handle their problems and may be detrimental in the long term for collective bargaining.Page ● 46
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper we presented an analytical framework for understanding the evolution of national labour 
relations institutions in Africa, outlined general features of actors and institutions, and, tried to show that 
organized industrial relations in Africa face serious challenges but there are also new opportunities and 
strategies that might enable collective actors to cope with these challenges and contribute to the solution of 
Africa’s structural problems. In this conclusion section, we would like to summarize these challenges and 
opportunities.
We revealed that trade unions in Africa, like in other parts of the world, has been losing members as 
global competition forced employers and governments to seek new ways of cost reduction and ﬂ  exibility 
(Horowitz 2007:230). Moreover, decreasing public employment due to privatizations imposed by structural 
adjustment programmes and austerity measures of last two decades, has been undermining the secure re-
cruiting grounds of trade unions, and thus further reducing their ﬁ  nancial strength and decreasing their ca-
pacity to device revitalization strategies. In this environment not only the weakening of organized industrial 
relations due to declining union density and bargaining coverage but shrinking formal employment too has 
become a real general threat for the proponents of decent work conditions in Africa. Indeed casualization 
and informalization of labour that enabled employers to avoid long term commitments to workers have be-
come common strategies in the private sector in many African countries and occasionally began to be used 
even in the public sector (Gockel 2009).  Under these circumstances already large informal sector appears 
to be expanding even further in majority of African countries. 
There are more speciﬁ  c problems as well. Due to declining public expenditure the basic infrastructure 
(transport system and energy supplies) that facilitates private entrepreneurship and thus reduces unemploy-
ment, which is obviously one of the primary sources of weakness for African trade unions, still remains un-
derdeveloped in many African countries. Similarly, the lack of comprehensive social policies and educational 
opportunities force many individuals to enter the labour market quite early and without speciﬁ  c skills. This 
pattern, while compelling many people to low-paying jobs, also leads to misuse of human capital of African 
economies, thus reduces their long term prospects for competing in the global markets with innovations 
rather than by cheap labor. This once again undermines the bargaining position of  trade unions and shrinks 
their potential constituency given that low-income workers quite often are not indispensable for employ-
ers, incapable of contributing membership fees, and, afraid to afﬁ  liate with unions. Moreover, HIV/AIDS Page ● 48
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epidemic remains not only as a threat for general health of African populations but it also undermines the 
productivity of African economies as remarkable proportion of working age people are infected and thus 
compelled to struggle against discrimination and be permanently occupied with serious health costs. Of 
course, in some African countries like Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Sudan, 
the public order itself is quite fragile due to civil wars and political instability, thus long term policies regard-
ing organized industrial relations cannot be formulated, nor can trade unions and employers’ organizations 
operate easily. 
Finally, in the recent climate of democratization and plurality in many African countries like Zambia, 
Mozambique and South Africa, trade unions face the peculiar challenge of plurality paradox: as freedom of 
association and speech are consolidated, new actors hitherto unknown in industrial relations, such NGO’s, 
social movements and international networks, began to play crucial roles in employment relations, and, new 
and smaller trade unions proliferated and they started to challenge the dominance of existing unions and 
federations. In this environment established trade unions and peak organizations ceased to be sole represen-
tatives of workers’ interests and their ability to promote their agendas as the interests of workers is reduced 
in many African countries. Thus interestingly proliferation of collective representation channels for workers 
appears to have, at least for now, weakened the ability of workers to forcefully articulate their demands in 
political arena and in tripartite councils.
However, all these observations should not lead one to reach a negative conclusion as to the future of 
organized industrial relations in Africa. First of all, the overall economic performance of Africa during the 
last decade, with the exception of last two years due to global crisis, has been positively surprising (ILO 
2010). In fact the growth in Africa has not only exceeded the world average but was also higher than some 
advanced economies. Similarly, some African countries, like Botswana, Mauritus and Leshoto proved to 
be capable of maintaining stable economies which can deliver sustainable growth, and increasingly coun-
tries like Kenya and Tanzania began to enter international trade through high value horticultural products. 
Against this background, it is argued that ﬁ  rst time after decades African people have some disposable 
income which might stimulate further growth and employment. In fact, one should not forget to note that 
although reductions in public expenditures across Africa have decreased the investments in infrastructure 
thus hampered the growth of private sector, in recent years, foreign (especially Chinese) investments in in-
frastructure generate incentives for private entrepreneurship and thus might stimulate increases in employ-
ment (Schoeman 2011:44). Although, so far this overall positive economic performance and prospects have Page ● 49
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not been translated into employment creation and productivity increases, one may easily argue that African 
economy in its entirety proved to have the potential which can generate the basic ingredients necessary for 
healthy industrial relations systems to develop, that is, there is added value that can be fairly shared between 
employers and workers. With appropriate economic policies and employment strategies this growth poten-
tial might also be used for addressing Africa’s structural problems. Obviously, in such an endeavor collective 
bargaining, trade unions and employers’ organizations can play vital roles.    
In fact, despite overall decline in the union membership across Africa, one can still spot some industries 
which provide fertile recruitment grounds for trade unions (Stirling 2011, Mugumo 2011). For example, 
workers in the horticulture industries across East Africa are inclined to get organized and trade unions man-
age to recruit new members from these industries. Similarly, despite the difﬁ  culties in organizing service sec-
tor, new telecommunications and banking industries, too, might be new avenues for unionization. Similarly 
it is difﬁ  cult to conceive that despite privatizations and lay-offs traditional capital-intensive sectors such as 
gas, mining and petroleum would be entirely deunionized (Erapi 2011). Finally, despite some inconsistent 
government attitudes towards collective bargaining in public sector, employment and organized industrial 
relations in public services such as health and education, too, would remain as refuge for trade unions which 
might allow them to retain the ﬁ  nancial and strategic resources that would allow them to expand into private 
sector. 
Perhaps another positive trend is the increasingly successful organization attempts in informal economy 
in many African countries. Trade unions in Africa are fully aware of the fact that expanding into informal 
sector or to collaborate with the self-organized associations of informal workers is no longer an option but 
a necessity in order to remain relevant actors in industrial relations. Moreover, this endeavor also enables 
African unions to establish international networks and form new alliances, which would also empower them 
as actors in usual industrial relations practices. Thus, although informal sector has always been one of the 
primary worries of trade unions, recent developments hint that it might be possible to develop revitaliza-
tion strategies by using the dynamics of informal sector’s organizational potential (Stirling 2011: 240-242, 
Mugumo 2011:36-37).   
Although the coverage is typically limited in African countries, in recent years collective bargaining 
began to address issues beyond wage claims, and thus, started to set new standards for employment condi-
tions, which might gradually shape the expectations of both employers and workers in formal employment. 
For example the inclusion of HIV/AIDS related articles, besides other non-wage issues, into collective Page ● 50
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bargaining agreements has become quite common across Africa so as to prevent discrimination of infected 
workers and facilitate their health care (Horowitz 2007:229, Stirling 2011: 244, Budlender 2009:28). In fact, 
by taking these developments into account, one may argue that although the coverage of collective bargain-
ing might be low or even declining , its depth has been gradually increasing so as to address a wider range 
of problems experienced by workers, a trend which may enhance the legitimacy and resilience of collective 
bargaining. Minimum wages too proved to be socially relevant and thus resilient components of African 
industrial relations, which inﬂ  uence not only wages in formal sector but also, due to lighthouse effects, have 
positive impact on informal sector wage developments. In fact, minimum wage institutions have another 
positive side-effect across Africa, that is, these systems provide tripartite platforms in which trade unions 
and employers organizations are recognized as established and legitimate actors and can at least mention 
their demands and positions to each other and to government ofﬁ  cials. Another important component of 
industrial relations in Africa whose value should not be underestimated is tripartism. The fact that African 
governments may avoid tripartite meetings for extended periods should not obscure the role of tripartism 
in preparation of some crucial pieces of labor legislation in countries like South Africa, Morocco Senegal 
and Nigeria during the last decade. 
In fact these recent changes of 2000’s in the legal frameworks in many African countries such as Ghana, 
Nigeria, Kenya, Egypt, Morocco, Zambia and Mauritius (Horwitz 2007:228)  contain positive elements for 
organized industrial relations. These new labour legislations attempt to regulate industrial relations in accor-
dance with the  requirements of changing global production regime. Typically, these laws, try to strike some 
kind of balance between the ﬂ  exibility demands of employers and security and representation demands 
of workers. Although, in general there is an emphasis on reconciliation and mediation, thus, the right to 
strike appears to have been de facto constrained (or like in Nigeria openly prohibited), new laws in some 
countries like Morocco, encouraged collective bargaining, and in general provided clear and mandatory rules 
for union recognition by employers, a development which would strengthen statutory standing of trade 
unions and would enhance the binding nature of bargaining agreements. Similarly, new laws in many African 
countries introduced streamlined dispute resolution mechanisms, which if effectively used by trade unions 
might make union membership more attractive for workers by proving that unions cannot only obtain gains 
through collective bargaining but they may also defend those gains more effectively than individuals by 
navigating through the statutory protocols. Page ● 51
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Perhaps it is appropriate to end this paper by recalling that industrial relations’ actors, especially trade 
unions, have played crucial roles in all transitions in contemporary history of Africa. Therefore, one might 
argue that it is only natural to expect them to remain important in future provided that they meet the chal-
lenges posed by the changes in production relations by effectively using the opportunities provided by new 
political landscapes and global trends.Page ● 52
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